Whether a country's central bank independence (CBI) status has a lowering effect on inflation is a controversial hypothesis. To date, this question could not be answered satisfactorily because the complex macroeconomics structure that gives rise to the data has not been adequately incorporated into statistical analyses. We have developed a causal model that summarizes the economic process of inflation.
Introduction
The impact of central bank institutional design on real economic outcomes received big attention over the last three decades. Whether a country's central bank independence (CBI) can lower inflation and provide inflation stability is a particular controversial issue. It has been claimed that more than 9,000 works have been devoted to the investigation of the role of CBI in influencing economic outcomes (Vuletin and Zhu, 2011) . After the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis, the debate on the optimal design of monetary policy authorities has become even more intense.
The statistical and economic literature is rich in studies that evaluate the relationship between CBI and inflation. A common approach is to treat countries as units in a linear regression model where inflation (percentage change of the Consumer Price Index (CPI)) is the outcome and a binary CBI index and several economic and political variables are covariates. While many studies have found that an independent central bank may lower inflation (Grilli et al., 1991; Cukierman et al., 1992; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Klomp and De Haan, 2010a,b; Arnone and Romelli, 2013) , other studies that used a broader range of characteristics of a nation's economy could not find such a relationship (Cargill, 1995; Fuhrer, 1997; Oatley, 1999) . Moreover, there have been studies suggesting that the effect of CBI on inflation can only be seen during specific time periods (Klomp and De Haan, 2010a) or only in developed countries (Klomp and De Haan, 2010b; Neyapti, 2012; Alpanda and Honig, 2014) .
There are numerous articles which have pointed out the weaknesses that come with simple cross-sectional regression approaches when evaluating the effect of CBI on inflation. First, the problem at hand is longitudinal in nature and only an appropriate panel setup may be suitable to estimate the (long-term) effect of CBI on inflation. Second, the question of interest is essentially causal: i.e. what (average) inflation would we observe in 10 years' time, if -from now on-each country's monetary institution would have an independent central bank compared to a situation where the central bank would not have been independent? Yet, the above mentioned cross-sectional regression approaches do not use any causal considerations in their analyses. Some more recent work has attempted to overcome at least parts of these problems. For example, Meade (2007, 2008) use a panel data setup with two time intervals and Klomp and De Haan (2010b) work with a random coefficient panel model. Other authors, e.g. Walsh (2005) , acknowledge that not only current CBI may cause future inflation, but also that current inflation is possibly related to the future CBI status. Several authors have thus tried to use instrumental variable approaches, but were unable to find strong instruments (Crowe and Meade, 2008; Jácome and Vázquez, 2008) .
It is clear that evaluating the effect of CBI on inflation requires a longitudinal causal estimation approach.
However, it has been shown repeatedly that standard regression approaches are typically not suitable to answer causal questions, in particular when the setup is longitudinal and when the confounders of the outcome-intervention relationship are affected by previous intervention decisions (Daniel et al., 2013) .
There are at least three methods to evaluate the effect of longitudinal (multiple time-point) interventions on an outcome in such complex situations: 1) inverse probability of treatment weighted approaches (IPTW, Robins et al., 2000) , 2) standardization with respect to the time-dependent confounders (i.e. g-formula-type approaches, Robins, 1986; Bang and Robins, 2005) , and 3) doubly robust methods, such as targeted maximum-likelihood estimation (TMLE, Van der Laan and Rose, 2011), which can be seen 1 as a combination and generalization of the other two approaches.
Longitudinal targeted maximum likelihood estimation (LTMLE; van der Laan and Gruber, 2012) is a doubly robust estimation technique which requires the fitting of models for the outcome and intervention mechanisms, iteratively at each time point. With LTMLE, the causal quantity of interest (such as an average treatment effect (ATE)) is estimated consistently if either the iterated outcome regressions or the intervention mechanisms are estimated consistently. LTMLE, like other doubly robust methods, has the advantage over other approaches that it can more readily incorporate machine learning methods while retaining valid statistical inference. Recent research has shown that this is important if correct model specification is difficult; such as when dealing with complex longitudinal data, potentially of small sample size, where relationships and interactions are most likely highly non-linear and where the number of variables is large compared to the sample size (Tran et al., 2019; Schomaker et al., 2019) .
Using causal inference in economics has a long history, starting with path analyses and potential outcome language (Tinbergen, 1930; Wright, 1934) and continuing with regression discontinuity analyses (Hahn et al., 2001) , instrumental variable designs (Imbens, 2014) , propensity score approaches in the context of the potential outcome framework (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) , among many other methods.
More recently there has been literature advocating the use of doubly robust techniques in econometrics (Chernozhukov et al., 2018) . From the perspective of statistical inference this is a very promising suggestion because the integration of modern machine learning methods in causal effect estimation is almost inevitable in areas with large number of covariates and complex data-generating processes .
However, the application of doubly robust effect estimation can be challenging for (macro-)economic data.
First, the causal model that summarizes the knowledge about the data-generating process is often more complex for economic questions compared to epidemiological ones, where most successful implementations have been demonstrated so far (Kreif et al., 2017; Decker et al., 2014; Schnitzer, Moodie, van der Laan, Platt and Klein, 2014; Schnitzer, Lok and Bosch, 2016; Tran et al., 2016; Schomaker et al., 2019; Bell-Gorrod et al., 2019) . The task of representing the causal model in a directed acyclic graph (DAG) becomes particularly challenging when considering how economic variables interact with each other over time. Thus, to build a DAG, a thorough review of a vast amount of literature is needed and economic feedback loops need to be incorporated appropriately. Imbens (2019) , who discusses different schools of causal inference and their use in statistics and econometrics, as well as different estimation techniques, emphasizes this point: "
[...] a major challenge in causal inference is coming up with the causal model."
Second, even if a causal model has been developed, identification of an estimand has been established and data collected, statistical estimation may be non-trivial given the complexity of a particular data set . If the the sample size is small, potentially smaller than the number of (timevarying) covariates, recommended estimation techniques can fail and the development of an appropriate set of learning and screening algorithms is important. The benefits of LTMLE, that is doubly robust effect estimation in conjunction with machine learning to reduce the chance of model mis-specification, can be best utilized under a good and broad selection of learners that are tailored to the problem of interest.
Estimating the effect of CBI on inflation is a typical example of a causal inference question which faces all of the challenges described above. Our paper makes five novel contributions to the literature. i) We discuss identification and estimation for our question of interest -and estimate the effect of CBI on inflation; ii)
we develop a causal model which can be applied to other questions related to macroeconomics in general;
iii) we demonstrate that it is possible to develop a DAG for economic questions, which is important as it has been argued that "the lack of adoption in economics is that the DAG literature has not shown much evidence of the benefits for empirical practice in settings that are important in economics." (Imbens, 2019) ; iv) we demonstrate how to integrate machine learning into complex causal effect estimation, including how to define a successful learner set when the number of covariates is larger than the sample size and when there is time dependent confounding with treatment-confounder feedback (Hernan and Robins, 2020) ; v)
we use simulation studies to study the performance of doubly robust estimation techniques under the challenges described above.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we motivate our question of interest, followed by the description of our framework. Section 4 contains the data analysis, and describes the doubly robust estimation strategy to estimate the effect of CBI on inflation. In section 5, we conduct simulation studies motivated by our data analysis. Section 6 concludes.
Motivating Question: Central Bank Independence and Inflation
When governments have discretionary control over monetary instruments, typically a short-term interest rate, they can prioritize other policy goals over price stability. For instance, after nominal wages have been negotiated (or nominal bonds purchased), politicians may be tempted to create inflation to boost employment and output (gross domestic product, GDP) or to devalue the government debt. This is referred to as the time-inconsistency problem of commitments to price stability. It results in an inflation rate higher than what is socially desirable. In order to overcome this outcome, the literature stresses the benefits of enforced commitments (rules). In particular, Rogoff (1985) has proposed to delegate monetary policy to an independent and "conservative" central banker to reduce the tendency to produce high inflation. Conservative means that the central banker dislikes inflation more than the government, in the sense that (s)he places a greater weight on price stability than the government does. Once central bankers are insulated from political pressures, commitments to price stability can be credible, helping to maintain low inflation. Rogoff's seminal paper had a two-fold effect: stimulating the implementation of central bank reforms on the policy side, and creating avenues for the design of indices which are suitable to capture the degree of independence of these institutions on the research side.
Following these ideas, a considerable policy consensus grew around the potential of having independent central banks to promote inflation stability (Bernhard et al., 2002; Kern et al., 2019) . Numerous countries followed this policy advice. Between 1985 and 2012, and excluding the creation of regional central banks, there were 266 reforms to the statutory independence of central banks, 236 of which were being implemented in developing countries. Most of these reforms (77%) strengthened CBI (Garriga, 2016) .
However, in spite of the broad impact of this policy advice, the empirical evidence backing it is still controversial. We thus investigate the effect of CBI on inflation with a causal framework that treats countries as units in a longitudinal (panel) setup. The data set we use in our analysis have been created specifically for this purpose, and extends the data set from Baumann et al. (2019) .
3 Methodological Framework
Notation
We consider panel data with n units studied over time (t = 0, 1, . . . , T ). At each time point t we observe an outcome Y t , an intervention of interest A t and several time-dependent covariates L j t , j = 1, . . . , q, collected in a set L t = {L 1 t , . . . , L q t }. Variables measured at the first time point (t = 0) are denoted as L 0 = {L 1 0 , . . . , L q 0 0 } and are called "baseline variables". The intervention and covariate histories of a unit i (up to and including time t) areĀ t,i = (A 0,i , . . . , A t,i ) andL s t,i = (L s 0,i , . . . , L s t,i ), s = 1, ..., q, respectively, with q, q 0 ∈ N.
We are interested in the counterfactual outcome Yā t t,i that would have been observed at time t if unit i had received, possibly contrary to the fact, the intervention historyĀ t,i =ā t . For a given intervention A t,i =ā t , the counterfactual covariates are denoted asLā t t,i . If an intervention depends on covariates, it is dynamic. A dynamic intervention d t (L t ) =d t assigns treatment A t,i ∈ {0, 1} as a functionL t,i . IfL t,i is the empty set, the treatmentd t is static. We use the notationĀ t =d t to refer to the intervention history up to and including time t for a given ruled t . The counterfactual outcome at time t related to a dynamic ruled t is Yd t t,i , and the counterfactual covariates at the respective time point areLd t t,i .
Likelihood
If we assume a time-ordering of L t → A t at each time point, use Y T as the outcome, and define Y t , t < T , to be contained in L t , the data can be represented as n iid copies of the following longitudinal data structure:
For the given ordering, we can write the respective likelihood L (O) as
In the above factorization, p 0 (·) refers to the density of P 0 (with respect to some dominating measure) and A −1 := L −1 := ∅. If an order for L t is given, e.g. L 1 t → . . . → L q t , a more refined factorization is possible. In line with the notation of other papers (e.g. Tran et al., 2019) , we define the q-portion of the likelihood to contain the outcome as well: q 0,Lt :=q 0,Lt × p 0 (Y T,i |Ā T −1,i ,L T −1,i ). Similarly, we define g 0 := T t=0 g 0,At and q 0 := T t=0 q 0,Lt .
Statistical Model
In line with the notation of Section 3.2, we consider a statistical model
for the true distribution P 0 that requires minimal (parametric) assumptions. In contrast to many medical applications we do not force restrictions onto this model; that is, A t and Y t are not deterministically determined for any given data history. Once an intervention is implemented it can be stopped at any time point, and potentially started again. Similarly, the outcome can be observed at any time-point and we do not assume that censoring is possible.
Causal Model
Causal assumptions about the data-generating process are encoded in the model M F . This nonparametric (structural equation) model states our assumptions about the time-ordering of the data as well as the causal mechanism that gave rise to the data. So far, it relates to
we do not make any assumptions regarding P U . However, in the data example further below, we need to enforce some restrictions on this distribution. The functions f O (·) are (deterministic) non-parametric structural equations that assume that each variable may be affected only by variables measured in the past, and not those which are measured in the future. Section 4.3 refines the causal model for the data-generating process of the motivating question, and represents any additional assumptions made in a DAG.
Causal Target Parameter and Identifiability
In this paper, we focus on the differences of intervention specific means, i.e. in target parameters like
If we set the intervention according to a static or dynamic rule (Ā t =d l t for ∀t) with l ∈ {j, k} in the causal model M F , we obtain the post-intervention distribution Pd T is the one that would have been observed had A t been set deterministically to 0 or 1 according to ruled l t . We thus restrict the set of possible interventions to those where the intervention is binary A t,i ∈ {0, 1}.
It has been shown that target parameters of the form (1) can be identified under the (partly untestable) assumptions of consistency, conditional exchangeability and positivity which are defined below. More specifically, it follows from the work of Bang and Robins (2005) and van der Laan and Gruber (2012) that given these three assumptions, using the iterative conditional expectation rule, and for the particular time-ordering as defined in Section 3.2, we can write the target parameter as
The assumptions of consistency, conditional exchangeability and positivity have been discussed in the literature in detail (Daniel et al., 2011 (Daniel et al., , 2013 Robins and Hernan, 2009; Young et al., 2011; Tran et al., 2019) . Briefly, consistency is the requirement that
Conditional exchangeability requires the counterfactual outcome under the assigned treatment rule to be independent of the observed treatment assignment, given the observed past: Yd t T A t−1 |L t−1 ,Ā t−2 for ∀Ā t =d t ,L t =l t , ∀t; and positivity says that each unit should have a positive probability of continuing to receive the intervention according to the assigned treatment rule, given that this has been done so thus far, and irrespective of the covariate history:
In principle, (conditional) exchangeability can be verified graphically in a DAG using the back-door criterion (Pearl, 2010; Molina et al., 2014) ; i.e. by closing all back-door paths and by non-conditioning on descendants of the intervention. For multiple time-point interventions, a generalized version of this criterion can be used to verify conditional exchangeability. This requires blocking all back-door paths from A t to Y T that do not go through any future treatment node A t+1 (Hernan and Robins, 2020) .
More generally, it has been suggested to use single world intervention graphs to verify exchangeability, particularly to evaluate identification for complex dynamic interventions. See Richardson and Robins for details (Richardson and Robins, 2013) .
Effect estimation with Longitudinal TMLE
The longitudinal TMLE estimator (van der Laan and Gruber, 2012) relies on equation (2). To estimate ψ j,k , one can separately evaluate each of the two nested expectation terms and integrate outL T −1 with respect to the post-intervention distribution Pd l t 0 . To improve inference with respect to ψ j,k a targeted estimation step at each time point yields a doubly robust estimator of the desired target quantity (see Van der Laan and Rose (2011) or Schnitzer and Cefalu (2017) for details). More specifically, we recur to the following algorithm for t = T, ..., 1:
with an appropriate model (for t = T ). If t < T , use the prediction from step 3d (of iteration t − 1) as the outcome and fit the respective model. The estimated model is denoted asQ 0,t .
2. Now, plug inĀ t−1 =d l t−1 based on ruled l t and use the fitted model from step 1 to predict the outcome at time t (which we denote asQd l t 0,t ).
3. To improve estimation with respect to the target parameter, update the initial estimate of step 2 by means of the following regression: 6 a) the outcome refers again to the measured outcome for t = T and to the prediction from item 3d (of iteration t − 1) if t < T . b) the offset is the original predicted outcomeQd l t 0,t from step 2 (iteration t). c) the "clever covariate" is defined as:
. The estimate of g 0,At=d l s is denoted asĝ At=d l s . d) predict the updated (nested) outcome,Qd l t 1,t , based on the model defined through 3a, 3b, and 3c.
This model contains no intercept. Alternatively, the same model can be fitted with H t−1 as a weight rather than a covariate (Kreif et al., 2017; Tran et al., 2019) . In this case an intercept is required.
We follow the latter approach in our implementations. . Now,ψ j,k and its corresponding confidence intervals can be calculated.
The estimate for E(Yd

Data-Adaptive Estimation for Complex (Macroeconomic) Data
The above estimation procedure is doubly robust which means that the estimator is consistent as long as either the Q-or the g-models (steps 1 and 3c in the algorithm described above) are estimated consistently (Bang and Robins, 2005) . If both are estimated consistently (at reasonable rates), the estimator is asymptotically efficient because the construction of the covariate in step 3c guarantees that the estimating equation corresponding to the efficient influence curve is solved, which in turn yields desirable (asymptotic) inferential properties (Van der Laan and Rose, 2011; Schnitzer and Cefalu, 2017) .
To estimate the conditional expectations in the algorithm one could use (parametric) regression models.
Under the assumption that they are correctly specified, this approach would be valid. However, in the context of complex macroeconomic data, as in our motivating example below, it is challenging to estimate appropriate parametric models because of small sample sizes, a large amount of relevant variables and complex non-linear relationships. Longitudinal TMLE can (in contrast to many competing estimation techniques) incorporate machine learning algorithms while still retaining valid inference to reduce the possibility of model mis-specification. However, in the settings presented below machine learning approaches need to be tailored to the specific problem and address the following challenges: i) Complexity: macroeconomic relationships are often highly non-linear and with various interactions of higher order, which need to be modeled in a sophisticated manner while taking into account the time ordering of the data.
ii) Dispensable variables: inclusion of covariates into the estimation procedure which are not required for identification, i.e. do not block any back-door paths, can potentially be harmful even if they are not colliders or mediators (Schnitzer, Lok and Gruber, 2016) ; that is, the inclusion of such variables can increase the finite-sample variance and lead to small estimated probabilities of following a particular treatment rule given the past, which may be both incorrectly interpreted as positivity violations and make the updating step in the TMLE algorithm unstable.
iii) p>n: for longitudinal macroeconomics data, the number of parameters is often larger than the sample size. This is because for long follow-up the whole covariate history needs to be considered, interactions may be non-linear, and different variables may have different scales and features that need to be modeled adequately. Consequently, one needs to either reduce the number of parameters with an appropriate estimation procedure or eliminate variables beforehand using variable screening.
It has been argued that screening of variables is inevitable to facilitate estimation with LTMLE in many settings (Schnitzer, Lok and Gruber, 2016) . Section 4.5 recommends possible approaches to tackle these challenges in common macroeconomic settings.
Data Analysis: Estimating the Effect of Central Bank Independence on Inflation
Data
We accessed databases of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to collect annual data for economic, political and institutional variables. Our outcome of interest is inflation in 2010 (Y 2010 ). All covariates are measured annually at equidistant points in time for t * = 1998, . . . , 2010. The intervention variable is central bank independence (CBI, A t * ) which we define as suggested by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) : their CBI index measures several dimensions of independence and runs from 0, the lowest level of independence, to 1, the highest level of independence. It contains considerations such as the independence of the chief executive officer (CEO) and limits on his/her re-appointment, the bank's independence in terms of policy formulation, its objective or mandate, the stringency of limits on lending money to the public sector, measures of provisions affecting (re)appointment of board members other than the CEO, restrictions on government representation on the board, and intervention of the government in exchange rate policy formulation. Our outcome variable is defined as the year-on-year changes (expressed as annual percentages) of average consumer prices measured by a CPI. A CPI measures changes in the prices of goods and services that households consume. To calculate CPIs, government agencies conduct household surveys to identify a basket of commonly purchased items and then track the cost of purchasing this basket over time. The cost of this basket at a given time, expressed relative to a base year, is the CPI; and the percentage change in the CPI over a certain period is referred to as consumer price inflation, the most widely used measure of inflation. Our measured covariates are L t * = {L 1 t * , . . . , L 18 t * } and include a variety of macroeconomic variables such as money supply, energy prices, economic openness, institutional variables like central bank transparency and monetary policy strategies, and political variables (See Figure   1 , Table 2 and Baumann et al. (2019) for details.). In line with the notation of Section 3 we consider Y t * ,
Our aim was to include as many countries as possible in our analysis. This entailed a trade-off between the number of countries and the completeness of the data set. We were able to collect annual data from 1998 to 2010 for 124 countries for 14 explanatory variables and for the dependent variable Y t * . We further derived growth rates and other indicators from those measured variables, to capture data for all 18 covariates (L t * ). Some of the data was missing, however. To decide whether the missing data was likely missing not at random (MNAR), and therefore possibly not useful without making additional assumptions, we examined countries' characteristics. We decided that observations for certain variables, countries or groups of countries had to be excluded because they were not available; for instance, sometimes wars, insufficiently developed institutions, social unrest or other reasons made the collection of data impossible.
We split the data set according to our assessment of whether the observation was MNAR or not. Data that we regarded to be missing at random (MAR) (2.7% of the data set) was multiply imputed using Amelia II (Honaker et al., 2011) , taking the time-series cross-section structure of the data into account. We did not impute data which was likely MNAR. However, some variables that were categorized as MNAR were used in the analysis (e.g. CBI). As a result, we obtained observations for 60 countries, 13 points in time (i.e. calendar years 1998-2010) for 19 measured variables (L 1
Fisher (1933)). To guarantee price stability, which excludes inflation beyond a certain level and deflation, an independent central bank is required. Over the last twenty years the optimal level of inflation has been associated with roughly 2%. If a country's inflation is constantly well above this level, in our case 5%, it will change the status of its central bank towards independence. The same holds for an inflation rate systematically falling below a value of zero. Note that for the dynamic interventiond 2 t * ,i , data prior to 1998 had to be collected and utilized.
We define the following two target parameters:
) − E(Yd from a general true distribution P 0 and to be ordered such that
In the context of our application we do not need to make any deterministic assumptions regarding our intervention assignment: a central bank can, in principle, be independent or dependent at any point in time, irrespective of the country's history -and thus be intervened upon.
As discussed in Section 3.4, we assume that each variable may be affected only by variables measured in the past, and not those which are measured in the future. In addition, we make several assumptions regarding the data-generating process which are summarized in the DAG in 
Identifiability Considerations
The DAG shows the causal pathways through which CBI can affect consumer prices, and thus ultimately inflation. We next explain the main paths from the intervention node to consumer prices. An independent central bank sets its policy tools autonomously in order to achieve its objective(s). Moreover, an independent central bank is less pressured to pursue an overly expansionary monetary policy which would produce only high inflation. Such a central bank is more likely to live up to its word which increases its credibility (arrow: 74). Higher credibility keeps inflation expectations in check (arrow: 32). The more contained inflation expectations are, the lower demands for nominal wage compensation will be (arrow:
75), which, in turn, keeps labor costs (arrow: 29), production costs (arrow: 23) and companies' prices There are several back-door paths from the intervention to the outcome. They all start with arrow 99 because CBI is influenced by past inflation which also affects current monetary policy decisions (arrow: 65). Monetary policy will in turn impact the formation of inflation expectations (arrow: 59) or the money supply (arrow: 52). Along edges 66, 67, 11, 6, 4 and 2 this affects the outcome. Under the assumption that the DAG as motivated in Appendix A is correct, establishing identification in terms of the (generalized) back-door criterion requires the following considerations: some back-door paths that start with an arrow from previous consumer prices into the intervention are subsequently blocked by the collider of monetary policy decisions (that is, along the edges 99, 65, 56, etc.). Other back-door paths along the edges 99, 65, etc. can be blocked by conditioning on the measured variable past inflation (L 9 t * ).
There are various paths from the intervention to the outcome that start with the edges 69, 49 and 52. All those paths contain mediators one should not necessarily condition on in our example because otherwise the effect of CBI on inflation through these paths would be blocked (Hernan and Robins, 2020) . The same considerations applies to the paths starting with the edges 74 and 32.
In summary, our DAG suggests that all back-door paths from A t * to the outcome (that do not go through any future treatment node A t * +1 ) can be blocked by inclusion of past inflation into the analysis. As many other variables lie on a mediating path from the intervention to the outcome (i.e. are descendants of A t * ), they should not be conditioned upon. A final consideration suggests that conditioning on past inflation (to block all back-door paths) may also block the indirect effect of CBI on the future outcome along the paths 72, 75 so that the estimation of the final effect that includes L 9 t * might be slightly conservative.
We argue that the developed DAG should serve as the basis for identification considerations and estimation strategies. However, in complex macroeconomic situations violations of this causal model need to be taken into account, and other estimation strategies may be useful as well. We now explain how this can be facilitated.
Data-adaptive Estimation with longitudinal TMLE
We can, in principle, follow the algorithm described in Section 3.6 to estimate the target quantity of interest. This includes estimation of the (nested) outcome modelQ t * (step 1) and the intervention model g 0,A t * =d l s (step 3c), for each time point. That is, we can estimate the g-model for t * = 1998, . . . , 2008 and Q t * for t * = 2000, . . . , 2010. As mentioned, the DAG assumes a 2-year lag before an independent central bank can potentially affect the outcome. It is thus sufficient to estimate the first Q-model in 2000 given the assumed lag-structure in the DAG. We define Y T := Y 2010 which corresponds to value for inflation in 2010 whiled 1 t * ,d 2 t * ,i (L 8 t * −1 ) andd 3 t * are the interventions targeting CBI as described in Section 4.2.
We consider three approaches to covariate inclusion. The first is based on the identifiability considerations related to our DAG, the other two refine variable inclusion criteria based on the scenario that some structural causal assumptions in the DAG may be incorrect.
i) DAG-based approach (PlainDAG): Based on the identifiability arguments from Section 4.4,L t * contains only the relevant baseline variables from the year 1998 that were measured prior to the first intervention node, as well as L 8 t * .
ii) Greedy super learning approach (ScreenLearn): This approach contains the full set of measured variables L t * . This approach assumes that each variable could potentially lie on a back-door path, but that this was undiscovered due to mis-specification of the causal model. For example, a researcher who argues that bank loans directly affect a central bank 's independence (i.e. that there is an arrow from bank loans to CBI) would have to consider a back-door path along the arrows 67, 11, 6, 4 ,2; and thus include public debt into L t * . Similarly, if it is doubted that some variables are not necessarily mediators, but rather confounders on a back-door path that exists due to unmeasured variables, e.g.
CBI → unmeasured variable → Output → . . . → Consumer Prices, then measured variables such as
Output (real GDP) would have to be included into L t * as well. We suggest that an analysis that includes all measured variables into L t * can serve as a useful sensitivity analysis to explore the extent to which effect estimates may change under different assumptions.
iii) Economic theory approach (EconDAG): A further approach, termed EconDAG, includes only variables which are measured during a particular transmission cycle, as defined by our DAG. That is, for the Q-model at t * every measured variable between t * − 2 and t * − 1 is included while for the estimation of the g-model at t * only variables at t * and past intervention variables are considered.
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As above, given the assumed time-ordering, only variables from the past, and not from the future, are utilized in the respective models.
Given the complexity of the data-generating process, it makes sense to use machine learning techniques to estimate the respective g-and Q-models. For a specified set of learning algorithms, and a given set of data, the method minimizing the expected prediction error (as estimated by k-fold cross validation) could be chosen. As the best algorithm in terms of prediction error may depend on the given data set, it is often recommended to use super learning instead -and this is what we use for i), ii) and iii). Super learning (Van der Laan et al., 2007) (or "stacking", Breiman (1996) ) considers a set of learners; and instead of picking the learner with the smallest prediction error, one chooses the convex combination of learners which minimizes the k-fold cross validation error (for a given loss function, we use k = 10). The weights relating to this convex combination can be obtained with non-negative least squares estimation (which is implemented in the R-package SuperLearner, Polley et al. (2017)). It can be shown that this weighted combination will perform asymptotically at least as well as the best algorithm, if not better (Van der Laan et al., 2008).
As described in Section 3.6.1, the challenge of model specification, including the choice of appropriate learners and screening algorithms, is to deal with the complex non-linear relationships in the data and the p > n problem.
Our strategy is to use the following algorithms: the arithmetic mean; generalized linear models (with main terms only, and also including all two-way interactions); Bayesian generalized linear models with an independent Gaussian prior distribution for the coefficients; classification and regression trees; multivariate adaptive (polynomial) regression splines; generalized additive models; Breimans's random forest; generalized boosted regression modeling and single-hidden-layer neural networks. The algorithms are carefully chosen to reflect a balance between simple and computationally efficient strategies and more sophisticated approaches which are able to model highly non-linear relationships and higher-order interactions that may be prevalent in the data. Furthermore, parametric, semi-parametric and non-parametric approaches were applied to allow for enough flexibility with respect to committing to parametric assumptions. In particular, tree-based procedures were chosen to handle challenges that frequently come with economic datafor instance outliers. In addition, since some of the continuous predictors are transformed by the natural logarithm, this strict monotone transformation may affect its variable importance in a regression based procedure while trees are not impaired in that respect.
For the strategies i)-iii), we use the following learning and screening algorithms: a) Screening algorithms: Used only for estimation approach ii) because of the large covariate set compared to the sample size; we used the elastic net (Zou and Hastie, 2005) , the random forest (Breiman, 2001 ), Cramer's V (where either 4 or 8 variables selected at a maximum) and the Pearson correlation coefficient. The screening algorithms were chosen such that at least a subset of them could handle both categorical and quasi-continuous variables well.
b) Learning algorithms: The 11 learning algorithms which are mentioned above are the same for estimations strategies i) and iii). i) and iii) where thus estimated with 11 algorithms each. In contrast, strategy ii) benefited from the 5 screening algorithms mentioned in a) and we thus omitted Generalized Boosted Regression Modeling from the learner set. In addition, learning algorithms that are applicable in the p > n case were added without prior screening to the 50 (= 5×10) algorithms. As a result, when Breimanss Random Forest and Single-Hidden-Layer Neural Networks were added without screening, 52 algorithms could be used for strategy ii); see also Figure 4 in the Appendix.
Results
The results of our analyses are visualized in Figure 2 .
Our main analysis ( Thus, if there is any inflation lowering effect from CBI, it is probably small. This is our main finding from a monetary policy point of view.
Interestingly, all three estimation approaches lead to similar results.
The diagnostics for all analyses are given in Table 1 . The cumulative product of inverse probabilities was never below the truncation level of 0.01, which was re-assuring. The maximum value of clever covariates, as defined in (3), was always well below 10, which suggests that the chosen super learning approach worked well. However, the mean clever covariate -which is supposed to be broadly around 1 -was not ideal for the dynamic treatment strategy 2, suggesting that ψ 2,3 should be interpreted with care. Table 1 : Row 1: percentage of observation that had to be truncated because the cumulative product of inverse probabilities was < 0.01. Rows 2 and 3: Mean and maximum value of the clever covariate. All results are averages over the 5 imputed data sets. Rows 4 and 5 contain the minimum and maximum of the five mean clever covariate values across the imputed data sets. A naive analysis comparing the mean reductions in inflation between 2000 and 2010 between those countries that had an independent central bank (for 1998 to 2008) and those that a dependent central bank, led to the following results: The mean reduction in inflation between 2000 and 2010 was 2.3 percentage points for those with independent central banks, compared to 1.0 percentage points for those that had dependent central banks. The difference in reduction was thus 1.3 percentage points (95% CI: -6.1; 3.5).
Such a crude comparison does however not permit a causal interpretation, and is not an estimate of ψ 1,3 .
Simulations
Motivated by our data analysis, we explore to what extent model mis-specification and choice of learner sets may affect effect estimation with longitudinal maximum likelihood estimation (and competing methods).
Data-Generating Processes
We specified two data generating processes: a simple one with 3 time-points and one time-dependent confounder; and a more complex one with up to 6 time points and 10 time-varying variables.
For the first simulation (Simulation 1 ) we assume the following time-ordering:
Using the R-package simcausal (Sofrygin et al., 2016) , we define pre-intervention distributions as listed in Table 4 (Appendix).
For the second simulation (Simulation 2 ) we use the following time-ordering:
. . , L 10 1 , . . . , L 1 5 , A 5 , Y 5 , L 2 5 , . . . , L 10 5 , L 1 6 , A 6 , Y 6 )
We generated the pre-intervention data according to the distributions specified in Table 5 (Appendix). 16
Target Parameter and Interventions
For both simulations we were interested in evaluating ATEs between two static interventions. That is, we were interested in
The target parameters of interest are thus
Estimations
In our primary analysis, we use longitudinal targeted maximum likelihood estimation for both simulations. In a secondary analysis, we also evaluated the performance of (longitudinal) inverse probability of treatment weighting (see, e.g., Daniel et al., 2013 and the references therein).
For LTMLE, we considered four different estimation approaches, the first for the first simulation and another three for the second simulation:
i) Estimation as explained in Section 3.6. Q-and g-models were fitted with (generalized) linear models. This is estimation approach GLM.
ii) Estimation as explained in Section 3.6. Q-and g-models were fitted with a data adaptive approach using super learning. There were four candidate learners: the arithmetic mean, GLM's, Bayesian generalized linear models with an independent Gaussian prior distribution for the coefficients, as well as classification and regression trees. No screening of variables was conducted. This is estimation approach L1.
iii) Estimation as explained in Section 3.6. Q-and g-models were fitted with a data adaptive approach using super learning. The same four learners as in L1 are utilized; however variable screening with Pearson's correlation coefficient was conducted. In addition, four more learners were added: multivariate adaptive (polynomial) regression splines (Friedman, 1991) , generalized additive models, generalized linear models including the main effects with all corresponding two-way interactions.
These additional four learners included variable screening with the elastic net (α = 0.75). This is estimation approach L2.
iv) Estimation as explained in Section 3.6. Q-and g-models were fitted with a data adaptive approach using super learning. The eight learning/screening combinations from L2 were used. In addition single-hidden-layer neural networks were used, once without variable screening and once with elastic net screening. Finally, the last learner is composed of classification and regression with the random forest after screening based on suitable variable importance measures. This is estimation approach L3.
We also obtained estimates for the ATE based on IPTW. The estimation of the propensity scores was identical to the estimation of the g-Models within LTMLE and is thus based on the estimation procedures described in i)-iv) as well.
Comparisons
We compared the estimated absolute (abs.) bias and coverage probabilities for the estimated ATE's for the two simulations, and for both correctly and incorrectly specified Q-models (see details below).
i) Simulation 1: The incorrect, mis-specified, Q-models omit L := (L 1 , L 2 , L 3 ) entirely. By contrast, the g-models were specified such that the entire covariate histories are being taken into account. As a result, if no screening is applied (estimation strategies GLM and L1), all relevant variables are used for estimation; with screening (estimation strategies L2 and L3) some variables might be omitted, however.
ii) Simulation 2: The incorrect, mis-specified, Q-models do not use L 1 := (L 1 1 , L 1 2 , L 1 3 , L 1 4 , L 1 5 , L 1 6 , L 1 7 ) for estimation. Thus, one relevant back-door path remains unblocked which leads to time-dependent confounding with treatment-confounder feedback. As for simulation 1, all g-models are specified such that the entire covariate histories are taken into account.
Results
The results after 1000 simulation runs are summarized in Figure 3 . Figure 3 : Absolute bias and coverage probability for both simulations -for correctly specified Q-and g-models (Both Correct) and mis-specified Q-models (Q Incorrect) of LTMLE.
In simulation 1, LTMLE provides approximately unbiased estimates even under mis-specified Q-models. This is because targeted maximum likelihood estimation is a doubly robust estimation and thus misspecification of either the Q-or g-models can be handled. However, the coverage probabilities are too high. See Tran et al. (2018) for a discussion on this issue.
Under the more complex setup of simulation 2, there is small bias if both the Q-and g-models contain the relevant adjustment variables (Both Correct) and learner set L1 is being used (Bias = 0.896, SE = 2.098). The more sophisticated learner sets L2 and L3 yield approximately unbiased estimates (Bias = 0.181 and 0.180; SE = 1.606 and 1.617). With incorrect specification of the Q-model, there is again small bias, but still acceptable given the Monte-Carlo Error (Bias = 1.426, 0.698, 0.647; SE = 2.414, 2.100, 2.112). Interestingly, for simulation 2 the most complex estimation approach with the biggest learner set L3 does not produce a substantial improvement compared to L2. This highlights that a simple increase in learners does not necessarily improve finite sample performance of LTMLE; though a sufficient breadth and complexity is certainly always needed as can be seen by the inferior performance of the first learner set.
In simulation 1, anti-conservative confidence intervals lead to large coverage probabilities. However, in simulaton 2, using L2 and L3 yields (close to) nominal coverage probabilities. Nevertheless, our results highlight the need to develop more reliable variance estimators, such that overall better coverage can be achieved.
Of note, while LTMLE produces approximately unbiased point estimates, IPTW does not seem to benefit from complex estimation procedures of the propensity scores (g-models) in the second simulation. The estimates are rather volatile, with some bias (but acceptable, as within the Monte-Carlo error), and poor coverage probabilities. These conclusions hold for all learner sets considered (Appendix, Figure 5 ).
Conclusions
We have shown that even for complex macroeconomics questions it is possible to develop a causal model and implement modern doubly robust longitudinal effect estimators. We believe this is an important contribution in light of the current debate on the appropriate implementation and use of causal inference for economic questions (Imbens, 2019) . Our suggestion was to commit to a causal model, justify it in much detail (as in Appendix A.2), but also discuss possible violations of it, and ultimately to conduct sensitivity analyses that evaluate effect estimates under different (structural) assumptions.
While the statistical literature has emphasized the benefits of doubly robust effect estimation in conjunction with extensive machine learning (Van der Laan and Rose, 2011), its use in sophisticated longitudinal settings has sometimes been limited due to computational challenges and constraints . We have shown how the use of screening and learning algorithms, which are tailored to the question of interest, can help to facilitate a successful implementation of this approach.
As stressed by Imbens (2019): "[...] models in econometric papers are often developed with the idea that they are useful on settings beyond the specific application in the paper". We hope that both our causal model, i.e. the DAG, as well as our proposed estimation techniques will be useful in applications other than ours.
Our simulation studies suggest that LTMLE with super learning can yield good point estimates compared to competing approaches, even under model mis-specification. However, both the coverage of confidence intervals and the appropriate choice of learners are challenges that warrant more investigation. Recent research confirms that the development of more robust variance estimators is urgently needed (Tran et al., 2018) , and learner selection becomes more diverse (Gehringer et al., 2018) .
From a monetary policy point of view, we conclude that there is no strong support for the hypothesis that an independent central bank necessarily lowers inflation, though our confidence intervals were wide.
Future research may investigate whether this finding holds for sub-groups of particular countries, such as developing countries, and for different time periods.
A More details on the causal model The level of the interest rate is determined by the intersection of money supply and money demand.
Unmeasured
Targeting Regime
Monetary policy strategy introduced in the 1990s aimed at stabilizing inflation at a preannounced point target or target range.
Exchange-Rate Regime Monetary policy strategy aimed at stabilizing inflation at a level commensurate with that of a strong currency. By pegging the currency to an anchor country's currency, its monetary policy and, hence, inflation is imported. Deviations from the target exchange rate are corrected by purchases and sales of the pegged currency.
Capital Openness Index measuring a country's degree of capital account openness. Fin. Open.
AS & MH
Adverse selection and moral hazard due to information asymmetries in credit markets. Unmeasured Firms' net worth A firm's total assets minus its total liabilities yields its equity. Unmeasured Firms' liquidity Firms' liquidity is directly linked to their cashflow. Cash is the most liquid asset and is used to meet short-term liabilities.
Unmeasured
Age structure Demographic indicator that captures the share of the total population older than 65 years. Age 65 (%) Trade openness
The sum of imports and exports is set in relation to the country's output. It is a proxy for globalization.
Imports + Exports / GDP Asset Prices
Prices of assets in which households, firms, or governments are able to hold wealth, such as stocks, bonds, bank deposits, cash or real estate.
Unmeasured
Real Interest Rate The difference between the nominal interest rate and the expected rate of inflation.
Unmeasured Currency Competition
Governments and central banks are forced to implement disciplined policies since they compete with foreign currencies for capital. The primary mechanism through which greater openness to foreign capital might lead to lower inflation arises presumably from its disciplining effect on monetary policy.
Unmeasured
CB Transparency
Central banks publicly announce their forecasts, policy decisions and assessments of the economy. A central bank's transparency is strongly related to its accountability and its credibility.
Transparency
CB Independence
Independence of a central bank from governmental bodies. Measured via de jure (e.g. statutes) indices, see main text for detailed explanations.
CBI
CB Credibility
A central bank that does what it has announced publicly is considered to be credible. This is reflected in inflation expectations that are low and stable.
Unmeasured
Pol. Instab. The percentage of veto players dropping from the government in any given year. In presidential systems, veto players are defined as the president and the largest party in the legislature. In parliamentary systems, the veto players are defined as the Prime Minister and the three largest government parties.
Pol. Stab.
Pol. Instit. The quality of political institutions.
Civil Liberties Time Preference
Time horizon envisaged by policymakers within which they want to achieve a certain macroeconomic outcome. It may vary from a short (high time preference) to a middle-to long-term perspective (low time preference).
Unmeasured
Share of Non-Tradables
Distinction between tradeable and non-tradeable goods. Non-tradability means that a good is produced and consumed in the same economy (e.g. haircuts).
Unmeasured GDP p.c.
GDP is the sum of all finished goods and services that are produced in a year. The p.c. term divides this value by the number of citizens. GDP p.c. is a proxy for economic wealth and living standards.
GDP pc (USD)
Bank Loans Commercial banks create money when they offer loans depending on the availability of central bank reserves at their disposal.
Credit (% GDP) Gr.
Past Inflation
Median of inflation during the past 7 years.
Inflation (%) MP Decision
Monetary policy makers' (i.e. central bankers') decisions are contractionary, neutral or expansionary.
Unmeasured
Wealth Households' wealth is accumulated savings over the last periods (can be negative in case of net debt) and disposable income in the current period.
Unmeasured 62 ". . . , when monetary policy is expansionary, the public finds that it has more money than it wants and so gets rid of it through spending. One place the public spends is in the stock market, increasing the demand for stocks and consequently raising their prices." Mishkin et al. (2013, p. 542) 63
Tobin defines q as the market value of firms divided by the replacement cost of capital. Mishkin et al. (2013, p. 540) 64 Asset returns have a significant effect on household savings. Disney et al. (2010) 65 Central banks' main objective is stable and low inflation. When inflation exceeds, or is expected to exceed a certain level, a reaction by the central bank follows. Taylor (1993) 66 ". . . the bank lending channel of monetary transmission operates as follows: expansionary monetary policy, which increases bank reserves and bank deposits, increases the quantity of bank loans available." Mishkin et al. (2013, pp. 542 f.) 67
"Because many borrowers are dependent on bank loans to finance their activities, this increase in loans will cause investment (and possibly consumer) spending to rise . . . ." Mishkin et al. (2013, pp. 542 f.) 68
Central bank transparency is multidimensional, covering political transparency (openness about policy objectives), economic transparency (openness about data, models, and forecasts), procedural transparency (openness about the way decisions are made, achieved mainly through the release of minutes and votes), policy transparency (openness about the policy implications, achieved through prompt announcement and explanation of decisions), and operational transparency (openness about the implementation of those decisions). Transparency is a means of enhancing the credibility of central bank commitments.
Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) 69
The most prominent argument for central bank independence is based on the time-inconsistency problem. It arises when the best plan made in the present for some future period is no longer optimal when that period actually starts. Implicitly, CBI reduces the time preference of monetary policy makers. Eijffinger and de Haan (1996, p. 5) 70
When a country becomes more open in economic terms, the nontraded sector becomes less important than the traded goods sector.
Lane (1997) 71
The more important the traded good sector, the less the monetary authorities stand to gain from surprise inflation because a monetary expansion in an open economy will be accompanied by a real depreciation of the currency, raising costs for households and business. The larger the share of imported goods, the greater the increase in inflation. (1997) and Romer (1993) 72
Lane
Past Inflation can be considered as a summary statistic of past consumer price movements. By definition.
73
"The hybrid Phillips curve is an example of how models used in the policy arena seek to overcome unsatisfactory features of both the adaptive expectations Phillips curve (it is empirically successful, but is subject to the Lucas critique; lacks micro-foundations and rational expectations; and lacks a channel for credibility to affect inflation) and the NKPC (which is forward looking and therefore not subject to the Lucas critique; has micro-foundations and rational expectations with a role for credibility, but counterfactual empirical predictions). The hybrid Phillips includes forward-looking inflation expectations but acknowledges that inflation appears to be persistent or inertial, i.e. that it depends on lagged values of itself....The hybrid Phillips curve can be rationalized by the assumption that some proportion of firms use a backward-looking rule of thumb to set their inflation expectations while the remainder use forward-looking expectations." Carlin and Soskice (2015, p. 610) 74
One way for a central bank to establish credibility is by increasing its independence. Blinder (2000) 75 Employees want to protect themselves from a loss in purchasing power, so they embed their inflation expectations into their nominal wages. Burda and Wyplosz (2010, p. 293) 76 "Expansionary monetary policy, which causes a rise in stock prices along the lines described earlier, raises the net worth of firms . . . ". Mishkin et al. (2013, p. 544) 77 "The lower the net worth of business firms, the more severe the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in lending to these firms. Lower net worth means that lenders in effect have less collateral for their loans, so their potential losses from adverse selection are higher.". Mishkin et al. (2013, p. 544) 78 "The lower net worth of businesses also increases the moral hazard problem because it means that owners have a lower equity stake in their firms, giving them more incentive to engage in risky investment projects. Because taking on riskier investment project makes it more likely that lenders will not be paid back, a decrease in businesses net worth leads to a decrease in lending and hence in investment spending.". Mishkin et al. (2013, p. 544) 79
In a more integrated world, competition between currencies is even more present since countries want to attract foreign investments and this race is exacerbated in a financially integrated world. Wei and Tytell (2004) 80
The primary mechanism through which greater openness to foreign capital might lead to lower inflation is presumably some sort of disciplining effect on monetary policy. Wei and Tytell (2004) 81
The quality of political institutions might directly influence the relationship between CBI and inflation. The effectiveness of CBI in strengthening credibility and enhancing inflation performance is increased by the presence of multiple political veto players or if checks and balances are sufficiently strong.
Keefer and Stasavage (2003) & Hayo and
Voigt (2008) 82 Political instability can have a number of possible effects. The most commonly discussed is that more instability makes it difficult for policy makers to commit to low inflation. Campillo and Miron (1996, p. 10) 83 Income per capita captures several possible effects. A higher level of income per capita is likely to be accompanied by a more sophisticated tax system and a more developed financial system, both of which imply lower optimal inflation tax and thus a negative relation with inflation. On the other hand, highincome countries might be better at innovating technologies for reducing the costs of inflation, so their inflation aversion might be lower. Campillo and Miron (1996, p. 11) 84
The life-cycle theory suggests that individuals plan their consumption and savings behavior over their lifecycle and smooth out their consumption over lifetime. Aggregate demand and supply shift because certain age groups and their particular economic behavior gain in relative importance to the rest of the population. Hence, changes in the demographic structure can exert potentially large effects on total savings. Bobeica et al. (2017, p. 5) 85 For given prices, nominal and real interest rates are directly linked through the Fisher equation. Burda and Wyplosz (2010, p. 524) 87 "Another balance sheet channel operates by affecting cash flow, the difference between cash receipts and cash expenditures. The rise in cash flow increases the liquidity of the firm (or household) and thus makes it easier for lenders to know whether the firm (or household) will be able to pay its bills. The result is that adverse selection and moral hazard problems become less severe, . . . ". Mishkin et al. (2013, p. 544 f.) 88
Money demand depends on nominal output so that the price level becomes relevant. Burda and Wyplosz (2010, p. 217) 89 & 90 The government collects its revenue also through tax payments. Walsh (2010, p. 136) 91 If the government runs a budget deficit by holding spending constant and reducing tax revenue, households current disposable income rises and, perhaps, their lifetime wealth as well. Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) 92 If the exchange-rate target is credible, it anchors inflation expectations to the inflation rate in the anchor country to whose currency it is pegged. Mishkin (1999, p. 581) 93
Pegging the exchange rate to a foreign anchor forces the country to adopt the foreign interest rate policy which affects broad domestic money supply. Mishkin (1999) 94
In an inflation (forecast) targeting framework, the central bank changes its short-term interest rate if the inflation forecast exceeds or falls short of the inflation target, until the inflation forecast equals the target.
In a related version of the inflation targeting strategy, the central bank may deem appropriate to adjust its monetary policy if the inflation forecast indicates a deviation from target (or its range). In either case, the money supply will be affected. Svensson (1997) and Jordan et al. (2010) 
95
A government that issues nominal debt has an incentive to promise low inflation ex ante in order to lower nominal interest payments and then reduce the ex post value of the debt through unexpected inflation. This incentive is stronger, the larger the public debt is. Kwon et al. (2009) 
96
Credit growth is a more important determinant of consumption than income growth. Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) 97 Capital and savings are usually valued by discounting. The amount of discount is mostly dependent on the real interest rate. Burda and Wyplosz (2010, p. 161) 99 Central bank reform has been prompted by the failure of past anti-inflation policies coupled with a belief that CBI will help deliver lower inflation in the future. C.2 Data-Generating Processes (DGP) t = 1 t = 2, 3 L t ∼ N (0, 0.25) L t ∼ N (L t−1 + A t−1 , 0.25) A t ∼ B(expit(L t ))
A t ∼ B(expit(L t + 2 × A t−1 − L t−1 )) Y t ∼ N (50 × A t + L t , 0.25) Y t ∼ N (50 × A t + L t + L t−1 + Y t−1 , 0.06) Table 4 : DGP for Simulation 1 t = 1 t = 2, . . . , 6 L 1 t ∼ N (0, 0.25)
t ∼ N (L 2 t , 0.25) L 8 t ∼ N (L 5 t , 0.25) L 9 t ∼ N (L 3 t , 1) L 10 t ∼ N (L 8 t + L 9 t , 0.25) 
